From MLM Library
Jump to: navigation, search

"What for Lenin was the Bolshevik Party is, today, in the conditions created by multinational organizations of capital, the international structure of imperialist repression at home and abroad, the organization of counter PROLETARIAN THAT COMES FROM THE GUERRILLA. In this process national and international it evolves and consolidates until it becomes REVOLUTIONARY PARTY."-RAF


The problem of the formation of an ARMY ARMY took place concretely in Italy around 1969-70. And that is when it became clear to even restricted political avant-gardes INTERNAL to the labor movement, that their material interests and their political needs were no longer represented by the Communist Party. And they would have been even less in the future, because the PCI already represented other interests of other classes. This had been true for a long time, but only then became awareness and caused a fracture, a division, which in the course of the strong struggles of the following years became more profound until it became irreversible, definitive. The deepening of the economic crisis and the articulation, in the crisis, of the strategic line of the "historic compromise" and of the consequent tactical choices, then transferred this awareness to a consistent layer of working class of the great poles and of a new metropolitan proletariat. This "transfer" has not been automatic, and we have played a fundamental role in it. It was a matter of focusing on the conscience of the Italian proletarians who, without the solution of violence in every phase of the revolutionary organization, could not give a revolutionary policy. In other words that: the alternative to revisionism was immediately given as a unity of the politician and the military. Decades of diseducation and revisionist rhetoric did not facilitate the realization of this goal. Therefore it was necessary, in a first phase, which lasted until now, to carry out an action mainly of PROPAGANDA ARMATA in order to make possible the accumulation of revolutionary capital necessary to proceed with direct actions against the State and its apparatus of coercion. This choice does not appear to us, five years later, voluntaristic or supra-structural. Its fundamental validity is demonstrated by the solid link existing today between the Organization and the people, a bond that has allowed us a continuous turnover and growth despite the hard blows brought by the repression. Today, not only has the Organization extended its initiative to the major industrial centers of the North, but new armed avant-gardes have been built and have begun to fight alongside us. To these avant-gardes we must address the call for a debate on the question of organization. The further accumulation of revolutionary capital also depends on this comparison. It is increasingly necessary for the revolutionary fighting forces to be measured within a "unity-struggle" process on the fundamental issues that underlie the construction of the Combatant Party of the Proletariat. For the meantime, we begin to make an initial assessment of our experience. What principles must be the basis of a militarized political organization? The practice of fighting in these years allows us to make some answers. We do this without pretending to establish "absolute" principles, but to contribute to the construction of a unified discourse, the premise and basis of a further impulse of the revolutionary process in our country. It goes without saying that these principles are binding on the militants of our Organization.


RED BRIGADES are not the Combatant Proletarian Party, but an armed vanguard working within the working class for its construction. That said, a problem remains: an armed vanguard must or should not "act as a party" since its inception? Many comrades of the revolutionary area reproach us for having given an affirmative answer to the question. But it is an incorrect view. Because it is not, it is true, to build the Party with an act of will or a decree, nor to set down abstractly some "Marxist-Leninist" principles, and then to proclaim themselves a Party, but it is not even necessary to be captured by the mirage. evolutionary of the construction of the Party by way of aggregation of scattered nuclei of autonomy that here and there are operating. The process of political, programmatic and organizational fabrication of the Combatant Party is not at all linear, evolutionary, entrusted to time, but on the contrary it is a discontinuous, dialectical process, a conscious product of a military political avant-garde which, in the complex phenomenon of war of class, it affirms the validity of the strategic perspective and of the communist program that sustains and the adequacy of the organizational tool necessary to achieve it. It therefore arises as an essential reference point, as a "strategic nucleus" of the Combatant Party under construction since its inception. It is not a question of "immodesty", as someone has wanted to say, because it is only presenting itself to the class movement with a well-defined political face that can create a polarity, a dialectic, with other positions and therefore expand its capacity for hegemony and organization or, on the contrary, succumb. This is why we are not convinced by the positions of those comrades who, while recognizing the need for military action, take on an identity only on the terrain of politics, while disguising the armed initiative behind different abbreviations. "Armed Spontaneism" and "armed arm" are weak theorisations that in the context of an imperialist, centralized repression and in positions of force, no one has to re-propose. Their disastrous consequences have already been severely paid for by the movement.


Before the seizure of power, every communist militant is a soldier of the class war, he is a leader of the armed struggle of the masses. He must be politically and militarily prepared to carry out this complex role of combatant, organizer and propagandist. Thus the proletarian vanguard assuming historical responsibility and the task of starting a process of armed struggle must be a direct expression of the movement of the working class. The passage to the "armed struggle" is not a passage to the conspiracy of the secret sects, and the organization of the beloved struggle does not live, as the masters would like, in the "covi". On the contrary, the guerrilla lives in the big factories and in the populous proletarian belts - of the industrial metropolis. His initiative does not arise "above the masses", but within them, and its main objective is to involve a gradually increasing portion of its political and military initiative.


The problem of war, of the actuality of the armed struggle understood as a proletarian implication to the crisis of imperialism and of the regime, is not a problem of defense of the threatened political spaces, of defense of "democracy". It is a problem of attack, of destruction of the repressive machine of the State, of violent imposition of the dictatorship of the proletariat on the bourgeoisie and therefore, in the last analysis, of armed struggle for communism. The Red Brigades in this perspective, are built for a war of long duration and movement. Their initiative of political disarticulation of the regime and of military disarticulation of the state, aims, at this stage, to force the bourgeoisie on the defense of an ever-increasing number of objectives, ever more extensive in space, ever more varied in quality. Because if Lenin's statement is "undeniable": "the defensive is the death of the insurrection", its implication is equally incontestable: the proletarian offensive is a factor of permanent crisis and progressive wear and tear of the bourgeois regimes. Precisely this approach requires the respect of three principles that are also of practical advantages: HIGH MOBILITY, AGILITY 'OF STRUCTURES, CLANDESTINTA' AS ORGANIZATIONAL MODULE. HIGH MOBILITY must be understood as the ability to constantly change points and attack fronts, so as to continually break the encirclement, not to provide fixed targets and to oblige the class enemy to a perennial race. And it also means carrying quick and continuous attacks, puncturing the nervous system of the bourgeoisie with the pin of guerrilla action. The AGILITY of structures means instead that in this phase of war, we must not undergo the conditioning of heavy organizational structures or, at least, that this conditioning must be reduced to the essential. It is a law of class war in the metropolis. We do not have to have the fetish of the structures. They are instruments that, in conditions of insecurity, must be abandoned, not defended. Everything is bought in the metropolitan society. The only problem is money and technical knowledge to turn money into revolutionary instruments. So it is important to have a great capacity for expropriation and a high level of technical-military knowledge in every guerrilla. This is the essential. Not, we can have "sanctuaries" in which to install heavy structures, and until we have them we will not even have to build them.


The issue of clandestinity has been placed in its real terms only after May 2, 1972. Until then, entangled as we were, in a situation of semi-legitimacy, it was understood more in its tactical or defensive aspects than in its strategic scope. Furthermore, the prejudice that opposes "clandestinity" and "mass line" slowed the awareness. It was the offensive unleashed by the enemy that erased any remaining doubt about the fact that clandestinity is an indispensable condition for the survival of any offensive military political organization that fights within the imperialist metropolises. On May 2, 1972 we began to build the armed proletarian vanguard starting from the most hermetic clandestinity. This did not prevent the organization from being carried out internally to the labor and proletarian movement and to that area of ​​avant-garde that went from 1972 to 1974 under the name of "workers' autonomy". On the contrary, precisely this innervation of the Organization within the class fabric has prevented the enemy from destroying us in spite of his repeated attempts and our inevitable (and partly avoidable) errors. In our experience, two conditions of clandestine militancy have been provided from the outset. The first condition is precisely that of those comrades who, through VOLUNTARY SELECTION, have broken all links with legality, with the family, with wage labor and have put all their energies at the service of the revolutionary war. These are the new professional revolutionaries. This choice of absolute clandestinity, as far as our Organization is concerned, does not coincide with the expulsion imposed by power on those revolutionary militants identified as responsible for combat initiatives and therefore, if they want to escape the prison they must lose track of them. Fugitive expresses a defensive relationship with respect to power. On the contrary, the choice of clandestinity is an offensive choice. Furthermore, the Organization indicates who, among its militants, must become part of its absolutely clandestine apparatus. And the criteria that underlie his choices are exclusively political-military criteria, that is, the maturity and experience of the militant candidate. This does not mean that all the militants of the Organization must have a subjective readiness to make the choices that the Organization will require of them. There is not necessarily a hierarchical relationship between the various conditions of clandestinity, but as a whole the REGULAR FORCES are composed of companions at the highest level of experience that the Organization has. The second condition of clandestinity is apparently less drastic, but it is only an appearance. In this case the militant retains his personal identity and his productive role in society, remains in the "movement" even physically and therefore appears and moves within the political forms that the class movement takes in the light of the sun. This second type of clandestine militancy, from a political point of view is at the basis of the construction of the articulation of proletarian power; from a military point of view it is the foundation of the development of workers and popular militias.


Subdivision is a general law of revolutionary war in the metropolis. And it is one of the fundamental security principles of our organization. Our experience has shown abundantly that those who neglect this law and do not apply it with absolute rigor are inevitably destined to defeat and destruction. The enemy works methodically and uses every error, even the smallest, that we commit on this ground. When, for any reason, the compartmentalisation between "jump" structures, we must renew them immediately. Marighella: "We must prevent everyone from knowing others and that everyone knows everything, everyone must know only what concerns his work". That: "Nobody, absolutely nobody, must know in conditions of clandestinity, other than strictly necessary, and we must never speak in front of anyone". In our organization the compartmentalisation is vertical between the various instances at all levels, and horizontal between the columns, between the fronts, between the brigades, between the companions of the same organism. Compartments are also residential houses, machines, meeting places or production sites. It is a conviction now common to all the guerrilla organizations that the compartmentalization, which obviously makes the immediate operation slower, in the long term makes it more agile, to the extent that it limits the blows coming from the enemy. Even if at first glance it seems that compartmentation makes operation very difficult, reality proves thoroughly that things are not so, little by little, once the Organization has adapted to this system, it comes to work with total fluidity . It is necessary to remember, however, that even the best compartmentalised structure would not last long without a real discretion of the militant. Discretion, in other words, is a fundamental rule of conduct for an urban guerrilla. It is equally important that compliance with safety and behavior rules. Compartmentalization does not mean "partitioning the political debate and all information". To overcome this danger, it is essential to extend and intensify the practice of informative reports and budgets of written experience. All the political structures of the Organization must feel this responsibility. The circulation of ideas in an urban guerrilla organization must take place by written means. For this reason the newspaper "LOTTA ARMATA PER IL COMUNISMO" was conceived and created: to have a stable instrument of political discussion.


This principle has been formulated very clearly by MLN-Tupamaros. We take it fully: "The reserve consists in never risking the totality of the available forces". It also consists of keeping entire sectors of the Organization, as well as key services, out of compromising jobs, always and when such a level of development has been achieved that allows it. That is to say: at a certain level of the process, and even more so if this has been crowned with success, we can verify the conditions for which it is necessary to reserve entire groups, which may become mandatory when the area in which we move and the conditions themselves do not permit the absorption of excessive clandestine militancy. That is when the ground is saturated.


These are the IRREGULAR FORCES that provide for the recruitment of new combatants. They must therefore perform a double function of political-military education and of filtering, extremely difficult and dangerous. Their work is then made even more complex by the fact that, to the extent that the guerrilla grows its prestige among the people, many comrades are willing to contribute in a thousand forms to its development even without necessarily entering into the fighting organisms and making therefore the choice of clandestinity. It is perfectly logical that there are different levels of commitment and different possibilities for collaboration. This does not mean providing alibis to opportunists, but making the most of all the different forms of support available. That said, it is good to set some basic principles: - In the Organization one enters only from the "bottom", whatever the history of the militant candidate, which is necessary not only for security and verification, but also in positive. The "working style" of our organization, in fact, has its own peculiarities and can not be learned outside of a militant practice that starts from apparently less important works .-- The judgment that every cell, in a collegial way, must give before proposing a new partner to the organization must be political, military and security. POLITICAL: you mean that you enter the organization to the extent in which they know and share the strategic line, the political program and the principles of organization. MILITARY: it means that you enter the Organization AFTER showing your total availability to the armed struggle. SAFETY: this means that the new militants must be verified on the application of safety and behavior rules; it means that there must be no gray areas on their past since the origin of their political militancy.


The two conditions of clandestinity correspond to two types of forces: the REGULAR FORCES and the IRREGULAR FORCES. Both are essential for our existence, but they play a different role. The FR are composed of the most mature and most experienced paintings that the armed struggle has produced. They are completely clandestine and the militants that compose them have cut off all kinds of links with legality. Our experience shows that without regular forces it is impossible to create and build stable revolutionary foundations, such as columns and fronts. The FRs are therefore of a strategic nature and their fundamental tasks are defined by the need for survival and development of the organization of the columns and fronts. Among the FRs there is a mutual control and systematically the practice of criticism and self-criticism in collegial bodies is exercised. Collegiali are also all the management centers. As the Tupamaros say: "There are no sacred cows.The risks and deprivations are the same for all: the leaders must take part in the actions, we do not want pure theorists". Manual work is distributed among all the comrades and every effort must be made to homogenize the ideological level. The lifestyle of every regular partner is based on maximum simplicity and austerity. REGULAR FROZE are organized into cells. IRREGULAR FORCES also have a strategic character, but the militants of these forces live in legality. Their is a clandestinity of organization but not personal. It is this position that imposes limits on their initiative and it is these "objective" limits that define the difference with FR. The FI partisan workers, however, play a more decisive role the more the civil clash is developed. They have two fundamental tasks: to win the widest popular support to the Organization; to construct the fighting bodies of movement and that is the articulations of workers' power in the current phase. From the political point of view there is no difference between the fighters of the FR and the FI fighters. Both contribute with equal rights and duties to live the general political line of the Organization. For this reason, even FI fighters can be called to be part of the Strategic Management. FIs are organized in factory or front cells. The set of multiple cells constitutes a brigade. Each cell must be composed of at least three combat units and in any case must not exceed five units. Each cell is represented by a commander who connects it to the upper level. As a nucleus of popular power the Brigade must enjoy "tactical autonomy", and to this end it has its own military and logistical structure. Tactical autonomy means operating within the strategic line of the Organization but taking responsibility for the intervention decisions related to one's own situation.


The Fronts have been set up to respond to the need for elaboration and homogenisation of work and struggle programs in specific sectors. They cut and travel the Organization vertically. Therefore, they are the most suitable channels to fulfill the task of centralizing the political debate. The fighting fronts in this phase are four: LOGISTIC; GREAT FACTORIES; counterrevolution; CARCERI and ANTIGUERRIGLIA.


The urban guerrilla works in conditions of "strategic encirclement." Its infrastructure must be built from this point in point: to break the encirclement means to evade the network of controls.In the metropolis these controls are not only military or, better, the military controls also use the mechanisms of bureaucratic and social control The logistical infrastructure of our organization must stand up to any bureaucratic, social and military control. So far we have tried to achieve this goal in a "tactical" way, that is, we have built the infrastructure by exploiting the "holes" of power and the technical limits of its control abilities.This phase requires the overcoming of this approach and the Assumption of an infrastructure construction line "together with the people". If the guerrilla wants to stay in the metropolis like a fish in the water and wants to build guerrilla warfare for "internal to the class movement", he must also build his survival, work and combat structures along this line. It is a utopia, even before a political error, to think of developing the construction of the guerrilla infrastructure in mid-air between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. The political principle "within the movement and together with its vanguard" must find the appropriate mediation also on the terrain of the infrastructure.


On the one hand, this front must analyze and identify the projects, organizations and key men of counter-revolutionary reaction to the rise of the class war; on the other hand, it must organize the people in combat organizations to strike without respite. Compared to past experience, it is a matter of carrying out self-criticism on two erroneous trends: the spying perversion and the anticipation of revolutionary power on a local basis. The first tendency leads to constructing a front as a "technical" structure for gathering information, but fails to grasp the deep tensions that shake the class movement and, therefore, to organize the people into fighting organisms. The second, stubbornly building revolutionary cells on a local, neighborhood basis, for example, fails to reconcile the specific form in which contradictions occur at the local level with general trends. The result is obvious: the impossibility of bringing the attack on the main contradictions.


The high number of losses is a law of urban guerrilla. To a certain extent it is also independent of errors of structure or behavior. Jail is therefore a second home for the revolutionary. It's not about feeling good, but not being there at all. Evasion remains the main objective of every political prisoner. The front must create the structures and conditions for this to be possible. In other words, the release of political prisoners is an indispensable goal of our revolutionary program. " Secondly, because in any case the permanence for some may be prolonged, it is: -to organize the movement of revolutionary inmates on a military political basis within the class war strategy; - to support and guarantee from the outside its OBJECTIVES and its SAFETY also through selective retaliation and intensity proportional to the violence suffered. The jailers must know that "nothing will go unpunished", and they must be convinced of it on the basis of the facts, thirdly the fact that the front must guarantee political connections with all the imprisoned comrades and provide for material, cultural and legal needs. But this is not enough yet. In fact, around the incarceration rotate all the institutions in charge of capture and judgment, namely the anti-guerrilla bodies and the regime magistracy. Tools of war and anti-proletarian retaliation that must be known and treated with equal violence. The organization of this work is also the task of this front.


Our work in the factories has as its main objective to build the strategic foundations of POWER WORKER. A second objective is to organize the vanguard layers of the working class within the guerrilla, that is, within the organization. The companions of the organization must therefore move along two directions. On the one hand, they have to put themselves at the head of all the political tensions that shake the factory and thus direct the movement on those objectives that express the maximum possible conscience in that situation. On the other hand, through the guerrilla action, they must open up new grounds for struggle and defend the movement from reprisals of power. It should be understood in depth the concept that THE OBJECTIVES OF THE MOVEMENT AND THE OBJECTIVES OF THE GUERRILLA EXISTS AN ESSENTIAL DIALECTIC RELATIONSHIP that it is up to the companions to understand and to underline in all their initiatives. Every brigade, that is, must live in a well-defined political context, while the "conspiratorial" tendencies of those comrades who conceive of clandestineness as "separation" must be absolutely fought .The brigade must fight and fight, organize and organize the movement to levels historically possible for the civil war, for the clash of power This means dialectizing the guerrilla movement with the resistance movement expressed by the working class. For this purpose around the brigade it is necessary to organize many networks of propaganda and support in order to reach and, therefore, to organize at the appropriate level all levels of consciousness available to the confrontation represented in the factory. Sectarianism is a curse that we must free ourselves from without losing the political capacity to establish clear discriminations and corresponding organizational ties. Joining the people to unite the people in the revolutionary class war is the supreme principle that must under any circumstances be the foundation of our work to build workers' power.


The Irregular Forces are involved in the movement, in its spontaneous and institutional expressions of mass through propaganda networks and stable support networks. The propaganda networks have a dual function: as roots of a tree they hold the Organization firmly within the most vivid manifestations of the class and allow a widespread circulation of information to the Organization and propaganda, slogans and indications of fight against the movement. The more extensive and complex this propaganda network will be, the greater will be the capacity of the guerrilla to build the POPULAR POWER. The support networks are composed of politically homogeneous comrades, who for various reasons can offer the Organization important services, without entering into the fighting structures. Each brigade must have the most support and propaganda networks, and each brigade partner must take charge of the political and military-political education necessary for that level of militancy.


Our choice of development of the Organization by poles implies, from an organizational point of view, a similar process of growth for Colonne. They achieve a "progressive splitting" of the Organization: the column is therefore a global organizational unit that reflects, synthesizes and mediates within it the complexity of the pole and its tensions, and the complexity of the Organization, its strategic approach. , its political line By saying that the columns are global military political units, we mean that they must be able to operate on all fronts within their territory. From a political point of view they are centralized through the Strategic Direction and the Fronts. From a military point of view they are self-sufficient and therefore they give as maximum objectives of confrontation what they are able to achieve autonomously. From an organizational point of view they are independent and compartmentalized. And that is, they rely on their own logistic apparatus that can solve ALL the problems. For no reason a column must lean on another for the realization of the services. Rather than breaking the compartmentalisation or breaking this principle it is better to take longer growth times. All columns must move according to the principle "rely on their own strength". The creation of new columns in the same pole or in other poles must always take place by parthenogenesis, or by progressive division of the Organization. And that is, the paintings that have achieved an overall experience of combat and organization in a column, are divided and give rise, joining new irregular forces, to other columns. It is the tradition of the revolutionary movement to name its combatant organizations to the heroes who with their blood have indicated to the proletarian masses what price each one must be willing to pay for the freedom of everyone, for a society like us we want: communist. This must also be our tradition. So we will name the column of Turin to the companion Margherita Cagol. From today, therefore, the Turin column will be called: "Colonna Margherita Cagol 'Mara' (Turin)".


The development by columns centered on metropolitan poles risks translating into an abstract architecture, to the extent that it does not take into account the fact that even outside the poles, decisive energies are being liberated to move on the terrain of the class war. How to use and, even before, how to organize these forces? In five years of struggle by our organization we have not given a satisfactory answer to the question. We have fluctuated between two extremes: ignore the problem or invite the most insistent companions to move to the poles. Now we have to give a less instrumental response. First of all we must take note of the existence of nuclei that are available to fight or who already fight outside the poles. Nucles that, due to their origin and their social base, can not be eradicated or "transplanted." We must understand that it is not possible to transfer these local avant-gardes without destroying the outbreaks of revolutionary initiative, that is without creating the premises of a contradiction which, in the long run, could prove to be very harmful between the city and the suburbs. Moreover, given the greater rarefaction of power, even the periphery can play, at this stage, an important function of support and support for urban warfare. It is through this action that combatants from peripheral areas can build the experience and political-military capabilities for the transition to the second phase: the generalized people's war. These forces can be organized into Revolutionary Committees alongside the columns. By Revolutionary Committee we mean a structure within the Organization, a political-military articulation of the Pillars, a fighting organism. Every conception of the revolutionary committee which tends to reduce it to a service structure must be excluded and we must also reject any dilution of its combat function. The Revolutionary Committee is the form of revolutionary power in the periphery and not a vague jumble of sympathizers. Its members are companions of the Organization that act within the strategy, tactics and political-military program. And for this, they, the Organization, take on the trend also the name and the symbol. The difference between Colonna and CR, in this phase, consists in the fact that the latter functionalizes itself to the dominant interests of the reference column and, therefore, subordinates its initiative to this. Moreover, due to the social and geographical characteristics of the territories in which they operate, the CR must be composed exclusively of FI.


It is the highest authority of our Organization. It collects and represents all the revolutionary tensions and energies matured in fronts, columns and irregular forces. These are the organs of collective management of the columns and fronts that elect the members of the DS, but the Executive Committee can veto any nominations when there are security reasons that impose it. The reasons for any exclusions must, however, be made public during the meeting. And the assembly has the power to decide. The members of the DS remain in office from one session to the next and can be reconfirmed or not reconfirmed. It is up to the DS council to formulate the general guidelines and the political line of the organization. The following rights are recognized by all members of the Organization: - the right to issue revolutionary laws and regulations; - the right to apply disciplinary corrections to those members of the organization who have behaved incorrectly or counterrevolutionary; - the right to formulate, approve and revise the financial statements; - the right and the power to modify the organization's structures; the right to appoint the members of the Executive Committee and to ask the reason for their actions. The Board can normally be convened twice a year and extraordinarily when this is required at least by a Column, a Front or the Executive Committee.


The Executive Committee has the task of directing and coordinating the activity of the columns and fronts between one Council and another. It responds to his work directly and exclusively to the Council and is appointed and can be revoked. In the EC the Fronts and Columns must be represented in order to allow an effective centralization of information and a rapid implementation of directives. All military actions of a general nature must be approved by the EC. All expropriation actions must be approved by the EC. For particularly important decisions that commit the Organization, the EC will have to consult with the various members of the DS. The EC will be able to apply those sanctions that it deems most appropriate to guarantee the revolutionary discipline. The EC is responsible for the administration and patrimony of the Organization. It is also the responsibility of the EC for the political press of the Organization and the issuing of general political communiques. EC members must not have political relations with the outside of the Organization. They must not carry out a recruitment action. They must restrict to the indispensable and tend to also eliminate relations with FIs. Like all the other members of the Organization, they participate in military, expropriation and manual work.