1974 - Some issues for discussion on the Organization

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1. The politico-military organization.

"The political struggle between the classes can no longer be developed without a precise military capability". From this belief was born in November 1970 our choice to proceed with the construction of an armed proletarian vanguard. The criteria that we have laid at the basis of this passage are known but we summarize them:

· The point of origin of the new revolutionary chapter are the political avant-gardes of the working class of the great factories of the industrial and metropolitan poles;

· It is from the political needs of this revolutionary stratum that we started for the construction of the armed revolutionary vanguard;

· For avant-garde armed we did not understand the armed arm of a disarmed mass movement but its highest point of unification, its prospect of power. The armed vanguard, that is since its birth, has been the revolutionary power of the exploited classes who fight against the system for the formation of a communist society and state;

· The armed proletarian vanguard, though born in the most rigorous clandestinity, does not renounce its internal lines to the forces of the area of ​​workers' autonomy.

2. The clandestinity.

The question of clandestinity has been placed in its real terms only after 2 May '72. Until then, entangled as we were in a situation of semi-legitimacy, it was seen more in its tactical and defensive aspects than in its strategic scope. Moreover, the prejudice that puts in opposition 'clandestinity' and 'mass line' slowed the awareness. It was the offensive unleashed by power against the organization on May 2 that erased any doubt that clandestinity is an indispensable condition for the survival of an offensive political-military organization operating within the imperialist metropolises.

On May 2, we began to build the armed proletarian vanguard starting from the most hermetic clandestinity. As we said in the first point, however, the condition of clandestinity does not prevent the organization from taking internal lines to the forces of the area of ​​workers' autonomy. In addition to the condition of absolute clandestinity, therefore, in our experience there is a second condition in which the militant, although belonging to the organization, works 'in the movement' and is therefore forced to appear and move in the political forms that the movement assumes in legality. This second type of clandestine militancy from a political point of view is at the base of the construction of the articulations of revolutionary power; from a military point of view it is the foundation of the development of workers and popular militias. Operating 'from clandestinity' allows a decisive tactical advantage over the class enemy who instead lives exposed in his men and his installations. This advantage is completely annulled when clandestinity is understood in a purely defensive sense. The defensive conception of clandestinity implies or hides the illusion that the clash between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat is ultimately played on the political rather than on the terrain of war, and that the military aspects are basically only tactical and supportive aspects. This misconception is still present in some 'autonomous assemblies' like that of Alfa Romeo, for example. when he says: "

3. The offensive setting.

The problem of war, of the actuality of the armed struggle understood as a proletarian aspect of the regime crisis, is not a problem of defense of the threatened political spaces, of 'defense of democracy'. On the contrary, it is a problem of attack, of armed struggle for communism. Ours is therefore an organization that in this perspective is built for a war of movement. It is the instrument of the initiative aimed at forcing the bourgeoisie on the ground of the defense of an ever-increasing number of objectives, ever more extensive in space, ever more varied in quality. Precisely this approach requires the respect of two principles which are also two practical advantages: the high mobility and the agility of the structures. THE' high mobility we must understand it as the ability to continuously change points and fronts of the attack in order to continually break the encirclement, not provide fixed targets and oblige the class enemy to a perennial run-up. The agility of the structures wants to say instead that in this phase of the war the columns must not undergo the conditioning of heavy organizational structures. Heavy installations, to the extent that they are indispensable, must therefore be governed directly by the central logistic front. agility of structures I would like to say that in this phase of the war the columns must not undergo the conditioning of heavy organizational structures. Heavy installations, to the extent that they are indispensable, must therefore be governed directly by the central logistic front. agility of structures I would like to say that in this phase of the war the columns must not undergo the conditioning of heavy organizational structures. Heavy installations, to the extent that they are indispensable, must therefore be governed directly by the central logistic front.

4. Live among the masses.

Our point of view is that the armed struggle for the historical and social characteristics of our country must be led by an organization that is a direct expression of the vanguard of the working class movement. In this phase we must therefore develop a guerrilla action linked to the political needs of this vanguard. Rooting the armed struggle in the movement means first of all to force the avant-garde of the movement to directly practice the armed struggle. More and more our military initiative will have to be conducted together with the people. A growing portion of the movement must therefore be involved in our military initiative. We must pay particular attention to the establishment of the relationship between organization and people, between fronts and people. Now if for the mass front the problem of the relationship between the front and the people has been clarified as the experience of the brigades proceeded, for the other two fronts it is a matter of making a great creative effort to avoid repeating tendencies not necessarily necessary. justified given the different tasks and different areas. Even on the mass front, however, one must make a greater creative effort to make Br Brend an effective dimension of local revolutionary power.

5. The columns.

Our strategic choice of organizational development by poly implies, from an organizational point of view, a similar process of growth by columns. The column is the minimal organizational unit that reflects, synthesizes and mediates within it the complexity of the pole and its tensions, the complexity of the organization, its strategic setting and its political line. The columns are overall political-military units. That is, they are able to operate on all fronts within a significant class pole. From a political point of view they are centralized through strategic direction and fronts. From an organizational point of view they are independent, that is, they rely on their own apparatus.

6. The compartmentalization.

Subdivision is a general law of revolutionary war in the metropolis. And it is one of the fundamental principles of the security of our organization. Our experience has shown that those who neglect this law or do not apply it with absolute rigor are inevitably destined to destruction. Marighella: "we must prevent everyone from knowing others and that everyone knows everything ... Everyone must know only what is related to his work". That: "nobody, absolutely nobody must know in conditions of clandestinity other than the absolutely essential and we must never speak in front of anyone".

In our organization it is necessary to realize a vertical compartmentation (between the various instances at all levels) and horizontal (between the columns, between the fronts, between the brigades, between the companions of the same organism). It is necessary to remember, however, that even the best compartmentalised structure would not last long without a real discretion of the militants. Discretion in other terms is a fundamental rule of conduct for an urban guerrilla. Compartmentalization does not mean 'partitioning a political debate and all information'.

7. Fronts

Fronts are a recent acquisition of our organizational experience. They were built to respond to the need for the elaboration of fighting organizations in specific policy areas (eg large factories, counter-revolution). They are not service structures. Fronts cut and travel vertically. They are therefore the most suitable channels to fulfill the task of centralizing the political debate. There are three fronts to be upgraded at this stage: the front of large factories; the fight front against the counter-revolution; and the logistic front.

The battle front to counter-revolution must set as its goal the conquest of strategic outposts for its existence, and furthermore: the improvement of the information apparatus, the development of the attack to the State already started with the Sossi campaign and a line of conduct that lead to affirm the hegemony of our strategic discourse on the forces of militant antifascism. The logistic front must first exist. Then his tasks are defined by the need to perfect and develop the logistics structures (bases, tools, means, documents); military (armament and military education); industrial (laboratories) and assistance (medical and legal and inaction).

8. Regular forces and irregular forces

Our organization is based on two types of forces. Regular forces and irregular forces. Both are essential for our existence, but they play a different role. Regular forces are composed of the most aware and available cadres that the armed struggle has produced. They are completely clandestine and the militants that compose them have cut all kinds of links with legality. Our experience shows that without regular forces it is impossible to create and build stable revolutionary bases such as columns and fronts. Regular forces therefore have a strategic character and their fundamental tasks are defined by the needs for survival and development of fronts and columns. Even the irregular forces - brigades or cells that are - have a strategic character, but the militants of these forces live in legality. Their is a clandestinity of organization but not personal. It is this position that imposes limits on their initiative and it is these 'objective' limits that define differences with regular forces. The partisan workers of the irregular forces, however, play a more decisive role the more the civil clash is developed. They have two fundamental tasks: to win the broader popular support to the organization; to build the centers and the articulations of revolutionary power. From a political point of view, there is no difference between the militants of the regular forces and the irregular forces. Both contribute with equal rights and duties to revive the general political line of the organization.

9. Strategic direction

At the origin of our history there is a nucleus of comrades who, by making revolutionary choices, has conquered an undeniable avant-garde role in combat. This historical nucleus has brought the organization up to now, subjecting as far as possible every fundamental choice, the victories and the defeats, to the discussion of the companions of the regular forces and the irregular forces. Today, with the growth of the organization and its influence, its complexity and its political and military responsibilities, this historical nucleus is in fact insufficient. It imposes a redefinition and an expansion of the overall managerial framework of the organization. It is therefore proposed to the discussion of the comrades the formation of a revolutionary council that collects and represents all the tensions and revolutionary energies matured in the fronts, in the columns and in the irregular forces. This advice should be the highest authority of the Br. To this advice must be recognized the indisputable function of strategic management of the organization. It will be the one to formulate the general guidelines and the political line of the organization. They must also be recognized by everyone: It will be the one to formulate the general guidelines and the political line of the organization. They must also be recognized by everyone: It will be the one to formulate the general guidelines and the political line of the organization. They must also be recognized by everyone:

  • The right to issue and apply revolutionary laws and regulations;
  • The right to judge and apply disciplinary corrections to those members of the organization who have behaved incorrectly or counterrevolutionary;
  • The right of approval and review of financial statements;
  • The right and the power to change the structures of the organization.

The council can normally be convened once or twice a year and extraordinarily when required by at least one column, one front or the EC. It will appoint an EC for the daily government of the organization.

10. The executive committee.

The EC has the task of directing and coordinating the activities of the front and the columns as well as the organization's relations between one council and another. To the EC can also be connected nuclei or individuals who carry out their militancy individually. It responds to his work directly and exclusively to the council and is appointed by it and can be revoked.

In the EC the three fronts must be represented in order to allow an efficient centralization of information and a rapid implementation of directives. All general military actions that invest the organization as a whole must be approved by the EC. If necessary for particularly important decisions, the Executive may consult the representatives of the columns. The EC is responsible for the administration of the assets and assets of the organization.